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In this paper, we document the fact that countries that have experienced occasional financial 
crises have, on average, grown faster than countries with stable financial conditions. We 
measure the incidence of crisis with the skewness of credit growth, and find that it has a 
robust negative effect on GDP growth. This link coexists with the negative link between 
variance and growth typically found in the literature. To explain the link between crises and 
growth we present a model where weak institutions lead to severe financial constraints and 
low growth. Financial liberalization policies that facilitate risk-taking increase leverage and 
investment. This leads to higher growth, but also to a greater incidence of crises. Conditions 
are established under which the costs of crises are outweighed by the benefits of higher 
growth. 
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Over the last two decades, countries that have experienced ﬁnancial crises have on average grown
faster than countries with stable ﬁnancial conditions. For this reason, we investigate the possibility
that the ﬁnancial liberalization policies that made possible crises in countries with weak institutions
also, and more importantly, relaxed ﬁnancial bottlenecks and increased growth.
We use the skewness of real credit growth to measure the incidence of ﬁnancial crises. Crises
happen only occasionally and during a crisis there is a large and abrupt downward jump in credit
growth. Such negative outliers tilt the distribution of credit growth to the left. Thus, in a long
enough sample, crisis prone economies tend to exhibit lower skewness than economies with stable
ﬁnancial conditions.1
We choose not to use the variance to capture the uneven progress associated with ﬁnancial
fragility because high variance captures not only rare, large and abrupt contractions, but also
frequent and symmetric shocks. Thus, unlike skewness, variance is not a good instrument to
distinguish safe paths from the risky paths associated with infrequent systemic crises.2
We estimate a set of regressions that include the three moments of credit growth in standard
growth equations. We ﬁnd a negative link between per-capita GDP growth and skewness of real
credit growth. This link is robust across alternative speciﬁcations and is independent of the negative
eﬀect of variance on growth typically found in the literature.
Thailand and India illustrate the choices available to countries with weak institutions. While
India followed a path of slow but steady growth, Thailand experienced high growth, lending booms
and crisis (see Figure 1). GDP per capita grew by only 99% between 1980 and 2001 in India,
whereas Thailand’s GDP per capita grew by 148%, despite the eﬀects of a major crisis.3
The link between skewness and growth is economically important. Our benchmark estimates
indicate that about a third of the growth diﬀerence between India and Thailand can be attributed
1Financial crises are typically preceded by lending booms. Since credit growth does not experience sharp jumps
during the boom and crises happen only ocassionally, the distribution of credit growth along a boom-bust cycle is
characterized by negative outliers, i.e., it exhibits negative skewness. In other words, credit contractions are clustered
farther away from the mean that credit expansions.
2We follow here the ﬁnance litterature that relates the negative skewness in stock returns with the incidence of
stock market crashes.
3This fact is more remarkable given that in 1980 India’s GDP was only about one ﬁfth of Thailand’s.to systemic risk taking. Needless to say this ﬁnding does not imply that ﬁnancial crises are good
for growth. It suggests that undertaking systemic risk has led to higher growth, but as a side-eﬀect,
it has also led to occasional crises.
Our sample consists of eighty three countries for which data is available over the period 1960-
2000. Although there is a signiﬁcant negative link between skewness and growth in this large
set, the strength of this link varies across diﬀerent subsets of countries. In particular, this link is
strongest across the set of countries with weak institutions, but functioning ﬁnancial markets. By
contrast, countries that have experienced either severe wars or large terms of trade deteriorations
typically exhibit negative skewness and low growth. In that set, negative skewness is induced by
events other than endogenous systemic risk.
In our model economy skewness is exogenous to growth. However, to address potential remaining
endogeneity we estimate an instrumentalv a r i a b l e sr e g r e s sion, where we use a ﬁnancial liberalization
index to instrument for skewness. As we explain below, under our theoretical mechanism, this index
is correlated with risk taking and does not have another independent eﬀect on growth.
In order to investigate the robustness of our ﬁndings we consider several estimation techniques
and perform several tests. In particular, we estimate the impact of skewness on growth both in
cross section and panel regressions using diﬀerent estimators consistent with alternative treatments
of unobserved eﬀects. We also test for robustness against potential outliers and extended sets of
control variables.
To explain these results we develop a model in which the interaction of weak institutions and
ﬁnancial liberalization promotes risk-taking, fast growth and occasional crises. Weak institutions
are reﬂected in imperfect contract enforceability, which generates borrowing constraints as agents
cannot commit to repay debt. This ﬁnancial bottleneck leads to low growth because investment is
constrained by ﬁrms’ cash-ﬂow.
When the government promises (either explicitly or implicitly) to bailout debtors in case of
a systemic ﬁnancial crisis, ﬁnancial liberalization may induce agents to coordinate in undertaking
insolvency risk. Since taxpayers will repay lenders in the eventuality of a systemic crisis, risk taking
reduces the eﬀective cost of capital and allows borrowers to attain greater leverage. Greater leverage
allows for greater investment, which leads to greater future cash ﬂow, which in turn will lead to more
investment and so on. This is the leverage eﬀect through which systemic risk increases investment
and growth along the no-crisis path. Risk taking, however, also leads to aggregate ﬁnancial fragilityand to occasional crises.
Crises are costly. Widespread bankruptcies entail severe deadweight losses. Furthermore, the re-
sultant collapse in cash-ﬂow depresses new credit and investment, hampering growth. Can systemic
risk taking increase long-run growth by compensating for the eﬀects of enforceability problems?
Yes. When contract enforceability problems are severe —so that borrowing constraints arise, but
not too severe —so that the leverage eﬀect is strong, a risky economy will, on average, grow faster
than a safe economy even if crisis costs are large.4
This mechanism explains why the negative link between skewness and growth is strongest across
countries with a middle degree of contract enforceability that we ﬁnd in the data. It also shows how
ﬁnancial liberalization leads to higher growth: by encouraging risk-taking ﬁnancial liberalization
eases ﬁnancial bottlenecks.
Notice that our results do not require that high variance technologies have a higher expected
return than low variance technologies. Because higher average growth derives from an increase in
borrowing ability due to the undertaking of systemic risk, our argument does not depend on the
existence of a ‘mean-variance’ channel.
Systemic risk depends on the existence of bailout guarantees for ﬁrms caught up in a ﬁnancial
crisis. These guarantees must be funded by domestic taxation and result in the redistribution of
resources from taxpayers to credit constrained ﬁrms. We show that when taxpayers beneﬁtf r o m
the production of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, this redistribution can be to the mutual beneﬁt
of both parties. The funding of the guarantees relaxes the ﬁnancial bottlenecks, which in turn
increases the present value of taxpayers’ income net of taxes.
Importantly, systemic risk is not always growth enhancing and socially eﬃcient. In particular,
if institutions are strong, there are no ﬁnancial bottlenecks to begin with. If institutions are too
weak, the leverage eﬀect is too small to compensate for the costs of crises.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical analysis. Section 3 ra-
tionalizes the link between growth and crises. Section 4 analyzes the ﬁnancing of the guarantees.
Section 5 presents a literature review. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
4This result does not apply to developed economies with strong institutions.2 Crises and Growth: The Empirical Link
Here, we investigate whether countries with risky paths that have experienced ﬁnancial crises have
grown faster, on average, than other countries. We also investigate whether this link is stronger in
countries with weak institutions and in those that are ﬁnancially liberalized.
We use the skewness of real credit growth to measure the incidence of ﬁnancial crises.5 Crises
happen only occasionally and during a crisis there is a large and abrupt downward jump in credit
growth. Such negative outliers tilt the distribution of credit growth to the left. Thus, in a long
enough sample, crisis prone economies tend to exhibit lower skewness than economies with stable
ﬁnancial conditions. Notice that when there are no other major shocks, crisis countries exhibit
strictly negative skewness.
Before we proceed, four comments are in order. First, occasional crises are associated not
only with lower skewness, but also with higher variance —the typical measure of volatility in the
literature. We choose not to use the variance to identify risky paths that lead to rare, large and
abrupt busts because high variance may also reﬂect other shocks, that could either happen more
frequently or be symmetric. These other shocks might be exogenous or might be self-inﬂicted by,
for instance, bad economic policy. Since there is an abundance of these other shocks in the sample,
the variance is not a good instrument to distinguish safe paths from risky paths associated with
ﬁnancial crises.
Second, typically crises are preceded by lending booms. During a lending boom there are
positive growth rates that are above normal. However, they are not positive outliers because the
lending boom takes place for several years, and in a given year, it is not as large in magnitude as
the typical bust. Only a large positive one-period jump in credit would create a positive outlier in
growth rates.6 Thus, boom-bust cycles typically generate negative, not positive, skewness.
Third, in principle, the sample measure of skewness can miss cases of risk taking that have not
yet led to crisis. This omission, however, would make it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a negative relationship






ν3/2 , where ¯ y is the mean and ν is the variance. The skewness of a symmetric distribution, such as the
normal distribution, is zero. Positive skewness means that the distribution has a long right tail and negative skewness
implies that the distribution has a long left tail.
6For instance, Thailand experienced a lending boom for almost all of the sample period and most of the distribution
is centered around a very high mean.between growth and realized skewness.7
Fourth, we acknowledge that negative skewness can also be caused by forces other than systemic
risk. To generate skewness these forces, however, must lead to abrupt and large falls in aggregate
credit. In our empirical analysis, we control explicitly for the two exogenous events that we would
expect to lead to a comparably large fall in credit: severe wars and large deteriorations in terms of
trade.
Skewness presents advantages over more elaborate ﬁnancial crises indicators because it is par-
simonious, objective and captures the real eﬀects of crises on credit growth. Importantly, it does
not require the dating of ﬁnancial crises. To illustrate how occasional crises reduce skewness Table
C1 considers the major systemic banking crises over the period 1980-2000. For each country, we
compute two skewness measures: one over the complete sample period, and another excluding crisis
years. The diﬀerence, which reﬂects the impact of crises on skewness, is negative in sixteen out of
the eighteen crisis countries.8
To illustrate how skewness is linked to growth, the kernel distributions of credit growth rates for
India and Thailand are given in Figure 2.9 India, the safe country, has a lower mean and is quite
tightly distributed around the mean —with skewness close to zero. Meanwhile, Thailand, the risky
fast-growing country, has a very asymmetric distribution and is characterized by a much larger
negative skewness.10
7Since crises are rare events, in a short sample period not all risky lending booms need to end in a bust (see
Gourinchas et. al (2001) and Tornell and Westermann (2002)).
8The list of crises and the dates are obtained from Caprio et.al. (2003). Crises reported are systemic banking
crises with output losses in our sample of 58 countries.
9The simplest nonparametric density estimate of a distribution of a series is the histogram. The histogram,
however, is sensitive to the choice of origin and is not continuous. We therefore choose the more illustrative kernel
density estimator, which smoothes the bumps in the histogram (see Silverman 1986). Smoothing is done by putting




2)I(|∆B| ≤ 1), where ∆B i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fr e a lc r e d i ta n dI is the indicator function
that takes the value of one if |∆B| ≤ 1 and zero otherwise. The bandwidth, h, controls for the smoothness of the of
the density estimate. The larger is h, the smoother the estimate. For comparability, we choose the same h for both
graphs.
10The Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis that the sample observations for Thailand come from a normal
distribution (which has zero skewness), with a p-value of 0.0003. This hypothesis is not rejected for India (p-value
of 0.5452). Furthermore, following Bekaert and Harvey (1997), we compute the mean, variance and skewness in a
joint GMM system where standard errors are corrected for serial correlation using the Newey-West procedure. The2.1 Regression Analysis
Our data set consists of all countries for which data is available in the World Development Indicators
for the period 1960-2000.11 Out of this set of eighty three countries we identify eleven as severe
war cases and fourteen as having experienced a large terms of trade deterioration.12
We estimate the impact of negative skewness on growth in a cross section regression, in a panel
regression with pooled generalized least squares estimators, and in a dynamic panel using general
method of moments methods. We address the issue of potential endogeneity with a two-stage least
squares regression, where we instrument skewness with a ﬁnancial liberalization index. We test
the robustness of our ﬁndings to potential outliers and additional control variables. Finally, we
consider other speciﬁcations of the panel regression that include ﬁxed eﬀects, random eﬀects and
time eﬀects.
In the ﬁrst set of equations we estimate, we include the three moments of credit growth in a
standard growth equation
∆yit = λyi0 + γ0Xit + β1µ∆B,it + β2σ∆B,it + β3S∆B,it + εit, (1)
where ∆yit is the average growth rate of per-capita GDP; yi0 is the initial level of per capita
GDP; Xit is secondary schooling; µ∆B,it, σ∆B,it and S∆B,it are the mean, standard deviation and
skewness of the growth rate of real bank credit to the private sector, respectively. We do not include
investment in (1) as we expect the three moments of credit growth, our variables of interest, to
aﬀect GDP growth through higher investment.
First, we estimate a standard cross-section regression by OLS. In this case 1980 is the initial
year and the moments of credit growth are computed over the period 1981-2000. Then, we estimate
a panel regression using generalized least squares. We consider two non-overlapping windows (1981-
null hypothesis of zero skewness can be rejected for Thailand (p-value=0.03), but not for India (p-value=0.18). Both
series have 85 quarterly observations.
11Although we focus on the period 1980-2000, we need the earlier data as some of the regressions require diﬀerencing
t h ed a t aa sw e l la st h eu s eo fl a g g e dv a l u e s .
12The severe war cases are: Algeria, Congo, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Sierra
Leone, South Africa and Uganda. Large terms of trade deterioration cases - annual fall of more than 30% in a single
year - are: Cote d’Ivoire, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Haiti, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Syria, Togo, Trinidad
and Tobago, Venezuela and Zambia. A detailed description of how these countries were identiﬁed is given in the
appendix.1990 and 1991-2000), and use two sets of credit growth moments, one for each window.
Table 1 reports the estimation results for the set of 58 countries that excludes cases of war and
terms of trade deteriorations. We ﬁnd that, after controlling for the standard variables, the mean
of the growth rate of credit has a positive eﬀect on long-run GDP growth. This has already been
established in the literature.13 What we establish is that negative skewness —a risky growth path—
accompanies high GDP growth rates. Skewness enters with negative point estimates of -0.40 and
-0.30 in the cross-section and panel regressions, respectively. These estimates are signiﬁcant at the
5% level.
Are these estimates economically meaningful? To address this question consider India and
Thailand over the period 1980-2000. India has near zero skewness, and Thailand a skewness of
about minus one. A parameter estimate of -0.40 implies that a reduction in skewness (from 0 to
-1), increases the average long-run GDP growth rate 0.40% per year. Notice that after controlling
for the standard variables Thailand grows about 1% more per year than India. Thus, about 40%
of this growth diﬀerential can be attributed to systemic risk taking, as measured by the skewness
of credit growth. Over the course of twenty years this 0.40% per year amounts to a level diﬀerence
of 16% in per-capita GDP.
Next, consider the variance of credit growth. Consistent with the literature, the variance enters
with a negative sign and it is signiﬁcant at the 5% level in both regressions.14 We can interpret
t h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on variance as capturing the eﬀect of ‘bad volatility’ generated by, for
instance, procyclical ﬁscal policy. Meanwhile, the negative coeﬃcient on skewness captures the
‘good volatility’ associated with the type of risk taking that eases ﬁnancial constraints and increases
investment.
Figure 3 depicts the marginal eﬀect of each moment of credit growth on per-capita GDP growth
for our sample of countries.15 It is evident that higher per-capita GDP growth is associated with
(a) a higher mean growth rate in credit, (b) lower variance and (c) lower skewness. In other words,
high per-capita GDP growth is associated with a risky path that is punctuated by occasional crises.
Although we control for the main determinants of economic growth, there can in principle be
13See for instance Levine et. al. (2000).
14Ramey and Ramey (1995) ﬁnd that ﬁscal policy induced volatility is bad for economic growth.
15In each graph, the residuals are computed from a cross-section regression that includes all variables except the
variable on the horizontal axis.other unobserved ﬁxed country characteristics and time eﬀects. In order to address this issue, we
follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1997), who employ a dynamic panel
regression, to estimate the following equation:
yi,t − yi,t−1 =( α − 1)yi,t−1 + β0Xi,t + ηi + εi,t,
where yi,t is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, Xit is the set of explanatory variables excluding
initial income and including a time dummy, ηi is the country-speciﬁce ﬀect, and εi,t is the error
term. The diﬀerenced equation has the form:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = α(yi,t−1 − yi,t−2)+β0(Xi,t − Xi,t−1)+εi,t − εi,t−1.
By construction, the new error term (εi,t −εi,t−1) is correlated with the lagged dependent variable
(yi,t−1 −yi,t−2). To correct for this correlation we use a GMM system estimator with lagged values
as internal instruments.16 The results are reported in column (3) of Table 1. As we can see, the
three moments of credit remain signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
2.2 Country Groupings
As we have discussed in the Introduction and will show formally in the model of Section 3, the
mechanism that links negative skewness and growth is strongest in countries with a middle degree of
contract enforceability (MEC). In these countries the undertaking of systemic risk relaxes borrowing
constraints and increases growth. By contrast, in countries with high enforceability (HEC), agents
have easy access to external ﬁnance, so growth is determined by investment opportunities not
borrowing constraints. At the other extreme, in countries with low enforceability (LEC) borrowing
constraints are too severe. Thus, the increase in leverage induced by risk taking is so small that it
is not reﬂected in a signiﬁcant increase in growth.
We use the rule of law index of Kaufman and Kraay (2003) to determine the HEC set. We
classify as HEC countries with an index greater than 1.3. From the remaining countries we deﬁne
LEC countries as those whose stock market turnover relative to GDP was less than one percent
in 1999. We take the nonexistence of an organized stock market as an indicator that contract
16The system estimator corrects for the potential imprecision of the diﬀerence estimator. The estimation procedure
is valid only under the assumption of weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables. That is, they are assumed to be
uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term.enforceability problems are very severe. This criterion selects nineteen HEC, twenty two MEC and
seventeen LEC countries.
As a ﬁrst pass, Table 2 compares the moments of credit growth across the three country groups.
We observe three striking facts: First, HECs don’t exhibit negative skewness. Second, while both
LECs and MECs have negative skewness, the latter have a lower skewness. Interestingly, MEC
credit grows almost twice as fast as that of LECs (7.7 percent vs. 4.2 percent). Third, variance is
highest in LECs and lowest in HECs. Since both groups have a lower growth than MECs, there is
no obvious linear relationship between variance and growth.
In order to capture more formally these diﬀerences, we add to our benchmark regression —
column (2) in Table 1— an interaction dummy that equals one if a country is an MEC and zero
otherwise. This dummy is interacted with the three moments of credit growth. Tables 4a and
4b show that, consistent with the prediction of the model, the eﬀect of risk taking on growth is
strongest across MEC countries. In that set a one unit reduction in skewness enhances growth by
0.622% and only by 0.138% in the other countries.17 This ﬁnding means that the growth enhancing
eﬀect of systemic risk is more than three times higher in MEC countries.18
The impact of variance on growth does not seem to diﬀer between MECs and other countries, as
the interaction dummy for variance is not signiﬁcant. Meanwhile, the eﬀect of mean credit growth
i ss u b s t a n t i a l l ym o r ei m p o r t a n ti nM E C s . I ti sm o r et h a nt h r e et i m e sa sh i g hi nM E C st h a ni n
other countries.
We would like to emphasize that the negative link between skewness and growth remains sig-
niﬁcant and quantitatively similar when we run the regression only with the MEC set, as shown in
column (2). This shows that the link between negative skewness and growth is not driven by the
diﬀerence between country groups. There exists a trade-oﬀ b e t w e e ns m o o t h n e s sa n dg r o w t ha c r o s s
the MEC set, as illustrated by the example of India and Thailand above.
Financial liberalization
17The estimate 0.622% is the sum of the coeﬃcient on skewness and that on skewness interacted with the MEC
dummy.
18As a robustness check we use an income per-capita threshold —$17,500 in 2000— to deﬁne the HEC set. With the
exception of three countries, the countries selected are the same as those selected by the rule of law criterion. Sign
and signiﬁcance levels remain the same, and point estimates are very similar.As we have discussed, the mechanism that links growth to crises requires not only weak insti-
tutions, but also policy measures that are conductive to the emergence of systemic risk. Financial
liberalization can be viewed as such a policy measure. In non-liberalized economies, regulations do
not permit agents to take on signiﬁcant risk.
To capture the fact that the interaction of weak institutions with liberalization is key, we classify
our data in country-years that are liberalized and those that are not liberalized. Table 3 shows that
negative skewness as well as high mean growth rates are associated with ﬁnancial liberalization.
This indicates that in the presence of weak institutions, liberalization has facilitated systemic risk
taking and has led to both higher mean credit growth and occasional crises.
To capture this diﬀerence more formally we introduce a liberalization dummy that equals one for
decades in which a country was liberalized, and zero for decades in which it was not.19,20 Tables 4a
a n d4 bs h o was i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerence in the eﬀect of skewness between liberalized and not liberalized
countries. In non-liberalized countries, the skewness coeﬃcient is positive and insigniﬁcant, while
in liberalized countries it is negative and signiﬁcant. This suggests that the risk-taking mechanism
we described is present only in liberalized economies. We can also see in column (3) of Table 4a
that the liberalization dummy enters positively and is signiﬁcant. This indicates that the eﬀect
of skewness is independent of other eﬀects that liberalization might have on growth through other
channels.21
Wars and terms of trade deteriorations
We should not expect the negative link between skewness and growth to exist when skewness
is generated by wars or terms of trade deteriorations. These shocks are exogenous and do not
reﬂect the relaxation of ﬁnancial bottlenecks induced by systemic risk. Nevertheless, to investigate
whether the eﬀect of negative skewness on growth is observed in an unconditional sample, we
estimate the panel regression including all 83 countries for which we have available data. Column
(4) in Table 4a shows that indeed skewness enters negatively and remains statistically signiﬁcant,
although the magnitude of the point estimate is reduced from -0.302 in the benchmark regression
19See the appendix for a description of how the liberalization index is constructed.
20Country-decades where there was a transition from closed to open were dropped from this regression. Fifteen
observations where dropped from the sample in this way.
21For an extensive empirical treatment of ﬁnancial liberalization dummies in growth regressions see Beckaert, et.al.
(2004).to -0.216.
In column (5), we include an interaction dummy that equals one for countries that have expe-
rienced either wars or large terms of trade deteriorations. As expected, the negative link between
skewness and growth is reversed for this set of countries.22
2.3 Instrumental Variables Estimation
In our model economy, the risk-taking mechanism that generates skewness is exogenous to growth.23
Thus, there is no reverse causality from mean growth to the asymmetric shape of the credit growth
distribution. Nevertheless, in order to overcome potential remaining endogeneity we use an index of
ﬁnancial liberalization to instrument for skewness. In the presence of contract enforceability prob-
lems, ﬁnancial liberalization permits the undertaking of systemic risk, which both relaxes borrowing
constraints and leads to occasional crises. Thus, in our model economy ﬁnancial liberalization is
correlated with negative skewness, but it does not have another independent eﬀect on growth,
making it an appropriate instrument.
Column (1) in Table 5 displays the estimates of the second stage of a two-stage least squares
regression. We can see that skewness is statistically signiﬁcant and has a point estimate which
is even greater than the one from our benchmark regression. Furthermore, the mean remains sig-
niﬁcant and of similar magnitude, but variance is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. Column (3)
shows that in the ﬁrst stage, there is a signiﬁcant negative link between ﬁnancial liberalization and
skewness.24 The result in the ﬁrst stage is consistent with the well documented fact that ﬁnancial
liberalization has been followed by boom-bust cycles.25
Regressions (1) and (3) estimated by GMM are given in column (2) (second stage) and (4) (ﬁrst
stage). They lead to qualitatively similar results as the two-stage least squares regression.
Finally, we acknowledge that there may be other independent channels through which ﬁnancial
22The sum of the coeﬃcient on skewness and that on skewness interacted with the dummy is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. A Wald test indicates that this sum is statistically signiﬁcant.
23 Risk taking allows agents to attain greater leverage, which increases investment and growth. Risk taking,
however, also implies that crises will occur occasionally. Since there is no reversed impact of growth on crisis, there
is also no causal impact of growth on skewness, making skewness a valid right hand side variable.
24However, as the F-statistic has only a value of 5.02, it must be considered only a weak instrument according to
the standard reference value of 10 in the literature.
25Kaminsky-Reinhart (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003)liberalization aﬀects growth that we have not accounted for in the model. We are nevertheless
conﬁdent that favouring the emergence of systemic risk is an important channel through which
ﬁnancial liberalization can aﬀect growth.
2.4 Robustness
Here, we show that the negative link between skewness and growth is robust to the elimination of
extreme observations, to the introduction of more control variables, and to alternative speciﬁcations
of the panel regression.
There are no statistical outliers in our regressions in the sense that a country’s residual devi-
ates by more than two standard deviations from the mean. Nevertheless, to see whether extreme
observations have an inﬂuence on our results we exclude, from our benchmark panel-regression, the
countries with the three largest and three lowest residuals both individually and collectively. The
countries with the largest positive residuals are China, Korea and Botswana. Those with the most
negative residuals are Jordan, Niger and Papua New Guinea. As Table 6 shows, the exclusion of
these extreme observations does not change our results. In particular, the coeﬃcient on skewness
is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The point estimates range between −0.24 and −0.32,
which are quite similar to our benchmark estimate of −0.30.
In Table 7 we add to our benchmark regression several control variables commonly used in
the empirical growth literature: the government share in GDP, life expectancy, inﬂation and the
terms of trade growth. The addition of these variables does not impact the estimates of the three
moments of credit growth.
Table 8a shows that our benchmark panel regression provides qualitatively the same results when
estimated with ﬁxed eﬀects, random eﬀects and time eﬀects. Table 8b shows that this robustness
also largely exists in the full set of 83 countries. The only exception is that skewness is not
statistically signiﬁcant in the random eﬀects model.
2.5 Overlapping Panel Methodology
Throughout the paper, the panel regressions are estimated using two non-overlapping ten-year
windows: 1981-1990 and 1991-2000. Two potential limitations of this procedure are the limited
number of observations in our panel, and the arbitrary division of the time intervals. Beckaert,Harvey and Lundblad (2001) —henceforth BHL— propose a methodology that addresses these issues
by exploiting the information in overlapping cross-sectional time series.
We implement the estimation strategy proposed by BHL by constructing a panel of ten-year
overlapping windows starting with the period 1981-1990 and rolling it forward to the period 1991-
2000. Thus, each country has eleven ten-year overlapping windows. Hence, this procedure generates
a data set of 638 observations.26
Using overlapping windows introduces a moving average component in the residuals. BHL
address this problem by estimating parameters with a generalized method of moments and by
adjusting standard-errors using a cross-sectional extension of Hansen and Hodrick (1980) that
deals with the moving average structure of the residuals.27 Following BHL we consider the following
regression speciﬁcation.28
∆yi,t,t+10 = β0xi,t + εi,t,t+10 t =1 9 8 0 ,....,1990,i =1 ,...,58, (2)
where ∆yi,t,t+10 is the ten-year average of per-capita GDP annual growth rate, and xi,t is a set of
predetermined regressors. In the baseline estimation, this set includes the logged per-capita GDP
for 1980, secondary schooling and the three moments of real credit growth.29
Table 9 reports the estimation results. In Column (1), the choice of the weighting matrix makes
the estimation equivalent to pooled OLS with a correction for the moving average component in
the residuals. Column (2) reports the estimation results using a more general GMM speciﬁcation
that allows for temporal, as well as cross-sectional heteroskedacity, and accommodates for seeming
unrelated regression eﬀects. Columns (3) and (4) include a time trend and an extended set of control
variables. They are estimated using the same methods as Columns (1) and (2), respectively. As we
can see, the use of overlapping windows conﬁrms our ﬁndings and generates a range of estimates
that is consistent with our non-overlapping panel regressions. In particular, the skewness of credit
growth enters negatively and signiﬁcantly at the 5% level in all regressions. The point estimates
range between -0.26 and -0.42, while our benchmark estimate is -0.30.
26We use the sample of 58 countries to meet the requirement of a balanced panel.
27See BHL for the derivation of GMM estimator and the alternative speﬁcication of the weighting matrix. No-
tice that when the Hansen-Hodrick estimator results in a non-invertible weighting matrix, the Newey-West (1987)
estimator is used instead.
28We are specially grateful to Geert Bekaert, Campbell Harvey and Christian Lundblad for having shared their
code with us.
29These variables are predertermined because they are computed over the ten-year interval [t − 10,t].In sum, our ﬁndings show that countries that followed a risky credit path have on average grown
faster than countries with stable credit conditions. These results do not imply that crises are good
for growth. They say that undertaking credit risk has led to higher growth, but as a side-eﬀect, it
has also led to occasional crises. This link between skewness and growth is robust and quite stable
across alternative sets of countries and speciﬁcations. Furthermore, this eﬀect is independent of
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of variance on growth.
3M o d e l
Here, we formalize the argument presented in the Introduction and show that it is internally
consistent. The link between growth and propensity to crisis derives from the fact that risk taking
allows ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms attain greater leverage. Furthermore, the model allows us to
determine when systemic risk is growth enhancing and when it is socially eﬃcient.
We consider an ‘Ak’ growth model with uncertainty. During each period the economy can be
either in a good state (Ωt =1 ) , with probability u, or in a bad state (Ωt =0 ) .T o a l l o w f o r t h e
endogeneity of systemic risk we assume that there are two production technologies: a safe one and
a risky one. Under the safe technology, production is perfectly uncorrelated with the state, while
under the risky one the correlation is perfect. For concreteness, we assume that the risky technology











t prob u, u ∈ (0,1)
0 prob 1 − u
(3)
where Is
t is the investment in the safe technology and Ir
t is the investment in the risky one.30
Production is carried out by a continuum of ﬁrms with measure one. The investable funds of a
ﬁrm consist of its cash ﬂow wt plus the one-period debt it issues bt. Since the ﬁrm promises to repay
next period bt[1 + ρt], the ﬁrm’s time t budget constraint and time t +1proﬁts are, respectively
wt + bt = Is
t + Ir
t (4)
πt+1 =m a x {qt+1 − bt[1 + ρt], 0} (5)
The debt issued by ﬁrms is acquired by international investors that are competitive risk-neutral
agents with an opportunity cost equal to the international interest rate 1+r.
30Since we will focus on symmetric equilibria, we will not distinguish individual from aggregate variables.In order to generate both borrowing constraints and systemic risk we follow Schneider and
Tornell (2004) and assume that ﬁrm ﬁnancing is subject to two credit market imperfections: con-
tract enforceability problems and systemic bailout guarantees. We model the ﬁrst imperfection
by assuming that ﬁrms are run by overlapping generations of managers who live for two periods
and cannot commit to repay debt. In the ﬁrst period of her life, a manager makes investment and
diversion decisions. In the second period of her life she receives a share e of proﬁts and consumes.
For concreteness, we make the following assumption.
Contract Enforceability Problems. If at time t the manager incurs a non-pecuniary cost
h·e·[wt+bt], then at t+1the ﬁrm will be able to divert all the returns provided it is solvent.
The representative manager’s goal is to maximize next period’s expected payoﬀ net of diversion
costs. We model the second imperfection by introducing an agency that grants bailouts when there
is a systemic default, but not when there is an idiosyncractic default.
Systemic Bailout Guarantees. The bailout agency pays lenders the outstanding debts of all
defaulting ﬁrms if and only if a majority of ﬁrms becomes insolvent (i.e., πt ≤ 0).
Bailouts are ﬁnanced by taxing the consumers, who own the ﬁrms. Consumers are inﬁnitely
lived, and can borrow and lend at the world interest rate. During every period the representative











δt+j[dt+j − ct+j − τt+j] ≥ 0, δ :=
1
1+r




[1 − ξj+1][bj[1 + ρj+1]+aj+1] − τj+1
ª
=0 , (6)
where ξt+1 =1if πt+1 > 0, and zero otherwise.
Since guarantees are systemic, the decisions of managers are interdependent and are determined
in the following credit market game. During each period, every young manager proposes a plan
Pt =( Ir
t ,Is
t ,b t,ρt) that satisﬁes budget constraint (4). Lenders then decide whether to fund these
plans. Finally, young managers make investment and diversion decisions.If the ﬁrm is solvent at t +1(πt+1 > 0) and no diversion scheme is in place, the old manager
receives eπt+1 and consumers receive a dividend dt+1 =[ d−e]πt+1. In contrast, if the ﬁrm is solvent
and there is diversion, the old manager gets eqt+1, consumers get [d−e]qt+1 and lenders receive the
bailout if any is granted. Finally, under insolvency consumers and old managers get nothing, while
lenders receive the bailout if any is granted. The problem of a young manager is then to choose an
investment plan Pt and a diversion strategy ηt to solve:
max
Pt,ηt
Etξt+1{[1 − ηt]πt+1 + ηt[qt+1 − h[wt + bt]]}e s.t. (4),
where ηt =1if the manager has set up a diversion scheme, and zero otherwise, and ξt+1 is deﬁned
in (6).
To sharpen the argument we assume that crises have very steep costs: in case of insolvency all
output is lost in bankruptcy procedures. In order to restart the economy in the wake of a systemic
crisis we assume that if a ﬁrm is insolvent, it receives an aid payment from the bailout agency (at)





[1 − d]πt if πt > 0
at otherwise
(7)
To close the model we assume that in the initial period cash ﬂow is w0 =[ 1−d]w−1, dividends are
d0 =[ d − e]w−1 and the old managers’ payment is ew−1.
3.1 Discussion of the Setup
We have considered a very stylized model to capture the essential features of the mechanism through
which policies that permit systemic risk taking lead to faster growth in economies where weak in-
stitutions give rise borrowing constraints. An attractive feature of this setup is that the mechanism
is transparent and the results depend on just two parameters: the degree of contract enforceability
h, and the likelihood of crisis 1 − ut+1.
In our setup, there are two states of nature and agents’ choice of production technology de-
termines whether or not systemic risk arises. This setup is meant to capture more complicated
situations, like for instance, the oft-cited phenomenon of currency mismatch whereby systemic risk
is endogenously generated through risky debt denomination.To make clear that the positive link between growth and systemic risk in our mechanism does
not derive from the assumption that risky projects have a greater mean return than safe ones, we
restrict the risky technology to have a lower expected return (uθ) than the safe one
1+r ≤ uθ < σ < θ (8)
Two comments are in order. First, the condition uθ < σ implies that the moral hazard induced
by the guarantees supports lending to ineﬃcient projects. Nevertheless, due to the leverage eﬀect,
an equilibrium with risky projects can be socially eﬃcient —as shown by Proposition 4.1. Second,
in our simple set-up relaxing 1+r ≤ uθ could lead to growth-enhancing systemic risk, but such
an equilibrium would be socially ineﬃcient. This condition could be relaxed in a more compli-
cated set-up with externalities. For instance, in the two-sector framework of Ranciere, Tornell and
Westermann (2003), greater leverage in the constrained sector has a positive externality on the
unconstrained sector.
The mechanism that links growth and the propensity to crisis requires that both borrowing
constraints and systemic risk arise simultaneously in equilibrium. In most of the literature there
are models with either borrowing constraints or excess risk, but not both. As Schneider and Tornell
(2004) show, in order to have both borrowing constraints and risk-taking, enforceability problems
must interact with systemic guarantees. If only enforceability problems were present, agents would
be overly cautious and the equilibrium would feature borrowing constraints, but no risk taking. If
only guarantees were present, there would be no borrowing constraints and risk-taking would not
be growth enhancing.
Notice that the two distortions act in opposite directions, and in general, neutralize each other.
Propositions 3.1-4.1 demonstrate that systemic risk is growth enhancing and socially eﬃcient only
when institutions are weak, but not too weak. In our setup countries with weak institutions have a
low level of contract enforceability h. More speciﬁcally we will assume throughout the paper that
enforceability problems are ‘severe’
0 ≤ h<u [1 + r] (9)
This condition is necessary for borrowing constraints to arise in equilibrium. Lenders are willing
to lend up the point where borrowers do not ﬁnd it optimal to divert. If (9) did not hold, the
expected debt repayment in a risky equilibrium would be lower than the diversion cost h[wt + bt]
for all levels of bt. Thus, lenders would be willing to lend any amount.We have assumed that guarantees are systemic. If instead institutions were so weak that
bailouts were granted whenever there was an individual default, borrowing constraints would not
arise because lenders would always be repaid (by taxpayers).
Our setup makes it diﬃcult to prove that systemic risk is growth enhancing and socially eﬃcient.
First, we have assumed that there are 100% bankruptcy costs (in case of a crisis all output is lost).
Second, in the wake of crisis cash-ﬂow of ﬁrms collapses (it equals the tiny aid payment at). Since the
production technology is linear, this collapse in cash-ﬂow reduces the level of output permanently.
Consumers do not play a central role. They are simply a device to transfer ﬁscal resources
from ﬁrms to the bailout agency. We will use the consumers to show that the ﬁscal costs of the
guarantees can be lower than the beneﬁts. The assumption that consumers can borrow and lend
at the world interest rate can be relaxed if we assume instead that the bailout agency has access to
an international lender of last resort. In this case the bailout agency would repay the international
l o a nf r o mt a x e sl e v i e di ng o o dt i m e s .
3.2 Equilibrium Risk Taking
In this subsection, we characterize the conditions under which borrowing constraints and systemic
risk can arise simultaneously in a symmetric equilibrium.
Let us deﬁne a systemic crisis as a situation where a majority of ﬁrms go bust, and let us denote
the probability that this event occurs next period by 1 − ut+1. Then, a plan (Ir
t ,Is
t ,b t,ρt) is part
of a symmetric equilibrium if it solves the representative manager’s problem, taking ut+1 and wt
as given.
The next proposition characterizes symmetric equilibria at a point in time. It makes three
key points. First, binding borrowing constraints arise in equilibrium only if contract enforceability
problems are severe (h<¯ h).I nt h i sc a s eaﬁnancial bottleneck arises as investment is constrained
by cash ﬂow. Second, systemic risk taking eases, but does not eliminate, borrowing constraints and
allows ﬁrms to invest more than under perfect hedging. This is because systemic risk taking allows
agents to exploit the subsidy implicit in the guarantees via a lower expected cost of capital. Third,
systemic risk may arise endogenously only if bailout guarantees are present. Guarantees, however,
are not enough. It is also necessary that a majority of agents coordinate in taking on risk, and
that contract enforceability problems are not ‘too severe’ (h>h). If h were too small, taking onrisk would not pay because the increase in leverage would be too small.
Proposition 3.1 (Symmetric Credit Market Equilibria (CME)) Borrowing constraints arise
if and only if the degree of contract enforceability is not too high: h<u t+1δ−1. If this condition
holds, credit and investment are
bt =[ mt − 1]wt,I r
t + Is





• There always exists a ‘safe’ CME in which all ﬁrms only invest in the safe technology and a
systemic crisis next period cannot occur: ut+1 =1 .
• There also exists a ‘risky’ CME in which ut+1 = u and all ﬁrms only invest in the risky
technology if and only if h>h (u), where h(u) is given by (19).
The intuition is the following. Given that all other managers choose a safe plan, a manager
knows that no bailout will be granted next period. Since the expected return of the safe technology
is greater than that of the risky technology (i.e., σ >u θ), she will choose a safe plan. Since the
ﬁrm will not go bankrupt in any state and lenders must break even, the interest rate that the
manager has to oﬀer satisﬁes 1+ρt =1+r. It follows that lenders will be willing to lend up to
an amount that makes the no diversion constraint binding: (1 + r)bt ≤ h(wt +bt). By substituting
this borrowing constraint in the budget constraint we can see that there is a ﬁnancial bottleneck:
investment equals cash-ﬂow times a multiplier (Is
t = mswt,w h e r ems =( 1− hδ)−1).31
Consider now the risky equilibrium. Given that all other managers choose a risky plan, a young
manager expects a bailout in the bad state, but not in the good state. Since lenders will get repaid
in full in both states, the interest rate that allows lenders to break-even is again 1+ρt =1+r.
It follows that the beneﬁts of a risky plan derive from the fact that, from the ﬁrm’s perspective,
expected debt repayments are reduced from 1+r to [1+r]u, as the bailout agency will repay debt
in the bad state. A lower cost of capital eases the borrowing constraint as lenders will lend up to
an amount that equates u[1+r]bt to h[wt+bt]. Thus, investment is higher than in a safe plan. The
downside of a risky plan is that it entails a probability 1−u of insolvency. Will the two beneﬁts of
a risky plan —more and cheaper funding— be large enough to compensate for the cost of bankruptcy
31This is a standard result in the macroeconomics literature on credit market imperfections —e.g. Bernanke et. al.




3.3 Long Run Growth
We have loaded the dice against ﬁnding a positive link between growth and systemic risk. First,
we have restricted the expected return on the risky technology to be lower than the safe return
(θu<σ). Second, we have allowed crises to have large ﬁnancial distress costs as cash-ﬂow collapses
i nt h ew a k eo fc r i s i sa n dt h ea i dp a y m e n t( at) can be arbitrarily small. Since the production
technology is linear, this fall in cash-ﬂow reduces the level of output permanently: crises have
long-run eﬀects.
Here we investigate whether, in the presence of borrowing constraints, systemic risk can be
growth-enhancing by comparing two symmetric equilibria: safe and risky. In a safe(risky) equi-
librium every period agents choose the safe(risky) plan characterized in Proposition 3.1. We ask
whether average long-run growth in a risky equilibrium is higher than in a safe equilibrium.
The answer to this question is not straightforward because an increase in the probability of
crisis (1 − ut+1) has opposing eﬀects on long-run growth. One the one hand, a greater 1 − ut+1
increases investment and growth along the lucky no- c r i s i sp a t hb yi n c r e a s i n g the subsidy implicit
in the guarantee and allowing ﬁrms to be more leveraged. On the other hand, a greater 1 − ut+1
makes crises more frequent, which reduces average long-run growth.
In a safe symmetric equilibrium, crises never occur —i.e., ut+1 =1in every period. Thus, cash
ﬂow dynamics are given by ws
t+1 =[ 1− d]πs
t+1, where proﬁts are πs
t+1 =[ σ − h]mswt. It follows
that the long-run annual growth rate, gs, is given by




Since σ > 1+r, the lower h, the lower growth. Consider now a risky symmetric equilibrium.
Since ﬁrms use the risky technology during every period t, there is a probability u that they will
be solvent at t +1and their cash-ﬂow will be wt+1 =[ 1− d]πr
t+1, where πr
t+1 =[ θ − u−1h]mrwt.
However, with probability 1 − u ﬁrms will be insolvent at t +1and their cash ﬂow will equal the
aid payment from the bailout agency: wt+1 = at+1. We parametrize at+1 as follows
at+1 = α(1 − d)(θ − u−1h)mrwt, α ∈ (0,1) (12)The expression multiplying α is the cash-ﬂow that the ﬁrm would have received had no crisis
occurred. Clearly, the smaller α, the greater the ﬁnancial distress costs of crises. Since crises can
occur in consecutive periods, growth rates are independent and identically distributed over time.
Thus, the long-run mean annual growth rate is given by
E(1 + gr)=uγn +( 1− u)γc,
γn =[ 1− d][θ − u−1h]mr,m r = 1
1−u−1hδ
γc = αγn (13)
The following proposition compares the mean growth rates in (11) and (13).
Proposition 3.2 (Long-run Growth) Consider an economy where crises have arbitrarily large
ﬁnancial distress costs (α → 0).
• Systemic risk arises in equilibrium and increases average long-run growth if and only if con-
tract enforceability problems are severe, but not too severe: h ∈ (h,uδ−1),w h e r eh is uniquely
deﬁned by (19).
• The greater h, within the range (h,uδ−1), the greater the growth enhancing eﬀects of systemic
risk.
A shift from a safe to a risky equilibrium increases the likelihood of crisis from 0 to 1−u. This






wt = mr − ms), which increases investment and growth in
periods without crisis. This is the leverage eﬀect. However, this shift also increases the frequency
of crises and the associated collapse in cash ﬂow and investment, which is bad for growth. This
proposition states that the leverage eﬀect dominates the crisis eﬀect if the degree of contract
enforceability is high enough, but not too high. If h is high enough, the undertaking of systemic
risk translates into a large increase in leverage, which compensates for the potential losses caused
by crises. If h were excessively high, there would be no borrowing constraints to begin with and
risk taking would not enhance growth.
An increase in the degree of contract enforceability —a greater h within the range (h,uδ−1)—
leads to higher proﬁt sa n dg r o w t hi nb o t hr i s k ya n ds a f ee c o n o m i e s .A ni n c r e a s ei nh can be seen
as a relaxation of ﬁnancial bottlenecks that allows greater leverage in both economies. However,
such an institutional improvement beneﬁts more the risky economy as the subsidy implicit in the
guarantee ampliﬁes the eﬀect of better contract enforceability.Notice that the threshold h in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 is the same. This implies that whenever
risk taking is individually optimal it is also growth enhancing. Observe, however, that systemic
risk and higher growth need not be socially eﬃcient. We will come back to this issue in Section 4.
Figure 4 illustrates the limit distribution of growth rates by plotting diﬀerent paths of wt corre-
sponding to diﬀerent realizations of the risky growth process. This ﬁgure makes clear that greater
long-run growth comes at the cost of occasional busts. We can see that over the long-run most of
the risky paths outperform the safe path, except for a few unlucky risky paths. If we increased the
number of paths, the cross section distribution would converge to the limit distribution.
The choice of parameters used in the simulation depicted in Figure 4 is detailed in Appendix B.
The probability of crisis (4.18%) corresponds to the historical probability of falling into a systemic
banking crisis in our sample of countries over 1980-2000. The ﬁnancial distress costs are set to
50%, which is a third more severe than our empirical estimate derived from the growth diﬀerential
between tranquil times and a banking crisis. The de g r e eo fc o n t r a c te n f o r c e a b i l i t yi ss e tj u s ta b o v e
the level necessary for risk-taking to be optimal (h =0.5). Finally, the mean return on the risky
technology is 2% below the safe return. Nevertheless, growth in the risky equilibrium is on average
3% higher than in the safe equilibrium.
Figure 5 plots the diﬀerence in log wt of risky and safe economies for varying degrees of contract
enforceability. As we can see, an increase in the degree of contract enforceability increases the
growth beneﬁts from risk taking. Figure 6 plots the diﬀerence in log wt for diﬀerent ﬁnancial
distress costs. Recall that if risk-taking is optimal, it is also growth enhancing for any arbitrarily
large ﬁnancial distress cost. Less severe distress costs evidently improve the average long-run growth
in the risky equilibrium. Notice that the upper curve is computed with the value of ﬁnancial distress
costs estimated from our sample of 83 countries over 1980-2000 (α =0 .8).
3.4 From Model to Data
The equilibrium of the model implies a negative link between skewness and growth, and it identiﬁes
the set of countries over which our mechanism is at work. We consider each in turn.
Skewness and Growth
In a risky equilibrium, ﬁrms face endogenous borrowing constraints, and so credit is constrained
by cash ﬂow. Since along a no-crisis path cash ﬂow accumulates gradually, credit grows fast butonly gradually. In contrast, when a crisis erupts there are widespread bankruptcies, cash ﬂow
collapses and credit falls abruptly. The upshot is that in a risky equilibrium the growth rate can
take on two values: low in the crisis state (gc), or high in the lucky no crisis state (gn).
Empirically, ﬁnancial crises are rare events.32 In terms of the model, this fact means that the
probability of the bad state 1−u is rather small, and in particular less than a half. This implies that
the low growth rate realizations (gc) are farther away from the mean than the high realizations
(gn). Thus, in a long enough sample, the distribution of growth rates in a risky equilibrium is
characterized by negative outliers and is negatively skewed. In contrast, in the safe equilibrium
there is no skewness as there is no uncertainty in the growth process.33 Since risk taking is optimal
whenever it is growth enhancing (by Propositions 3.1 and 3.2), it follows that there is a negative
link between mean long-run growth and skewness.
Quality of Institutions and Policy Environment
Our argument has two empirical implications that underlie the country grouping criterion and
the instrument selection in Section 2. First, our model predicts that on average we should observe
a stronger link between systemic risk and higher long-run growth in countries with a middle degree
of institutional quality than in other groups of countries. Second, our model predicts that this link
should be stronger in the set of ﬁnancially liberalized countries.
The model emphasizes two key aspects of the quality of institutions. The ﬁrst aspect has to
do with the degree of contract enforceability h. On the one hand, borrowing constraints arise in
equilibrium only if contract enforceability problems are ‘severe’: h<¯ h. Otherwise, borrowers would
always ﬁnd it proﬁtable to repay debt. On the other hand, risk taking is individually optimal and
systemic risk is growth enhancing only if h>h . Only if h is large enough can risk taking induce
a big enough increase in leverage to compensate for the distress costs of crises. It follows that a
positive link between systemic risk and long-run growth exists only in the set of countries where
contract enforceability problems are severe, but not too severe: h ∈ (h,¯ h).
The second aspect of the quality of institutions is the generosity of the guarantees. If institutions
are so weak that a bailout is granted whenever there is an isolated default —because authorities
32In the set of countries we consider, the probability of crises is around 4%.
33In this argument we have used the fact that in our setup two crises can occur in consecutive periods. However, a
similar argument could be made if a crisis were followed by a recovery during which another crisis could not happen
(see Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2003)). In that setup no-crisis times are more frequent that crisis times.cannot withstand the political or corruption pressures, the mechanism does not work. Instead,
there would be a collusion between politically connected lenders and borrowers to run and ﬁnance
unproductive projects and extract taxpayers’ money through bailout guarantees.34 Institutions
must be suﬃciently strong so that bailouts are grant e do n l yi nc a s eo fas y s t e m i cc r i s i s . 35
Consider next the policy environment. The moderately weak institution framework we have
described above is not suﬃcient to generate systemic risk. Proposition 3.1 implies that the presence
of policies that liberalize ﬁnancial markets and allow agents to take on systemic risk is necessary.
The key for the risk-growth link is the combination of moderately weak institutions with ﬁnancial
liberalization.
4 Financing of the Guarantees
The existence of systemic risk and high average growth rates depend on systemic guarantees, which
are funded domestically via lump-sum taxes on consumers. Here, we consider an economy with
severe contract enforceability problems, and ask whether the expected value of the dividend stream
n e to ft a x e si sg r e a t e ri nar i s k yt h a ni nas a f ee q u i librium. That is, we ask whether taxpayers will
be made strictly better oﬀ by ﬁnancing the bailout guarantees. By fully accounting for the costs
and beneﬁts associated with the ﬁnancing of the guarantees, we can assess when systemic risk is
not only growth enhancing, but also socially eﬃcient. Notice that our setup is biased against the
eﬃciency of guarantees: the risky technology is restricted to have a lower expected return than
the safe technology, there is no externality associated with higher investment, and during a crisis
all output is lost in bankruptcy procedures and cash-ﬂow collapses. This means that all the social
gains from risk taking come from the ability to attain greater leverage.
To simplify notation we set, without loss of generality, the interest rate r to zero.36 Thus, the
expected present value of the representative consumer’s net income is
Y = E0
X∞
j=0[dj − τj], (14)
where the dividend dj equals [d − e]πj in periods without a crisis and zero otherwise, and the
34This phenonenon has been described by Faccio (2004) and Khawaja and Mian (2004).
35If the decision to ﬁnance the guarantees involved an international ﬁnancial institution, its monitoring capacity
would be part of the insitutional environment.
36We ensure that the sums below converge by setting d suﬃciently high.sequence of taxes {τj} satisﬁes the bailout agency’s break-even constraint (6). In a safe equilibrium
taxes are always zero because insolvencies never occur. Since during every period t ≥ 1 proﬁts are
πs




j=0[d − e]wj−1 =
d − e
1 − γsw−1, γs =1+gs (15)
Consider next the risky equilibrium. When a crisis erupts the bailout agency pays lenders the
debt they were promised (bj−1) and gives ﬁrms a small amount of seed money (aj). To ensure that
the bailout agency breaks even consider a tax sequence in which, during each period, taxes equal
the bailout payments. This sequence is feasible because taxpayers have access to complete ﬁnancial
markets. It follows that the expected present value of the taxpayer’s net income is









d − e[1 − (1 − u)αγn] − [1 − u][(mr − 1)(1 − d)+αγn]
1 − γr w−1, γr =[ u +( 1− u)α]γn
where ξj =0if there is a crisis at time j. The ﬁrst two terms in the numerator represent the average
dividend, while the third term represents the average tax, which covers the seed money given to





πt−1wt−1 =( mr − 1)(1 − d)wt−1.37
The next proposition states that if enforceability problems are not too severe, the ﬁscal costs
of crises are outweighed by the beneﬁts of greater growth.
Proposition 4.1 (Financing the Guarantees and Social Eﬃciency) If the manager’s pay-
out rate e is small enough, there exists a unique threshold for the degree of contract enforceability
h∗∗ <u , such that the expected present value of taxpayers’ net income is greater in a risky economy
than in a safe one for any aid policy α ∈ (0,1) if and only if h>h ∗∗.
To get further insight into social eﬃciency consider the excess social return of ﬁrms when the
37The term −e[1−(1−u)αγ
n]wt−1 reﬂects the fact that during no crisis times the old manager gets a share e of wt,
while in a crisis she gets nothing. This is as if, with probability 1−u, the old manager does not get ewt = eαγ
nwt−1.manager’s share e tends to zero. Rewrite (15) and (16) as follows
Y s − w−1 =( 1 − d)(σ − 1)ms w−1





Y r − w−1 =( 1 − d)(uθ − 1)mr w−1





We can interpret Y i − w−1 = Rimi w−1
1−γi as the expected excess social return of a ﬁrm. This excess
return has three components: the static return (Ri); the leverage (mi − 1); and the mean growth
rate of cash-ﬂow (γi). S i n c ew eh a v ei m p o s e dt h ec o n d i t i o nuθ < σ, the following trade-oﬀ arises.
Projects have a higher rate of return in a safe economy that in a risky one (Rs >R r), but leverage
and scale are smaller (ms <m r). In a risky economy, the subsidy implicit in the guarantees
attracts projects with a lower return but permits greater scale by relaxing borrowing constraints.
This relaxation of the ﬁnancial bottleneck is dynamically propagated (γr > γs).I fh is high enough,
greater leverage and growth compensate for the costs of crises. Thus, when contract enforceability
problems are of limited severity, the excess return in the risky economy is greater than in the safe
economy.
Is systemic risk socially eﬃcient whenever it is growth enhancing? The answer is no. When
ﬁnancial crises are very costly, social eﬃciency depends on our measure of the weakness of institu-
tions, as the next Corollary shows.
Corollary 4.1 (Growth vs. Eﬃciency) If crises have large distress costs, the social eﬃciency
threshold h∗∗ is greater than the risk-taking (and growth-enhancing) threshold h. In this case sys-
temic risk is growth enhancing but socially ineﬃcient if h ∈ (h,h ∗∗).
We have seen that systemic risk is growth enhancing whenever it is individually optimal (Propo-
sitions 3.1 and 3.2). When the ﬁnancial distress costs of crises are large, there is a range for the
degree of contract enforceability in which risk taking is individually optimal (h>h ), but not so-
cially eﬃcient (h<h ∗∗). When h ∈ (h,h ∗∗) the leverage gains obtained by ﬁrms are big enough to
justify individual risk-taking, but are not big enough to compensate for the social costs of ﬁnancial
crises.
The reason for this gap is the following. The social cost of borrowing is identical in safe and
risky economies. However, while in the former the individual ﬁrm internalizes 100% of the debtcosts, in a risky economy the individual ﬁrm internalizes only a share u of the debt costs and
taxpayers cover the rest. As a result, risk taking might be individually optimal, even if it is not
socially eﬃcient. To see when this is the case consider the ratio of excess social returns
Y r − w−1
Y s − w−1
=
Eπr





The k ratio is smaller than one because σ > θu and h<u .Since at the threshold h expected
proﬁts in both economies are equal (Eπr = πs), the social return is greater in the safe economy.
T h el e v e r a g ee ﬀect implies that Eπr grows faster with h than πs. Hence, when h is high enough
the risky-safe leverage gap more than compensates for the social cost of crises and Y r >Ys.
We want to emphasize that our results do not imply that guarantees are always socially eﬃcient.
I na d d i t i o nt oC o r o l l a r y4 . 1 ,w eh a v es e e nt h a ti n the absence of a mechanism to relax borrowing
constraints, bailout guarantees are unambiguously bad. This occurs if either h is too high, so
that borrowing constraints do not arise, or h is too low, so that there is no signiﬁcant increase in
leverage.38
The funding of the guarantees can be interpreted as a redistribution from the ﬁnancially un-
constrained to the ﬁnancially constrained agents in the economy. On the one hand, taxpayers
beneﬁt from the guarantees because higher mean growth means higher dividend growth. On the
other hand, taxpayers bear the ﬁscal costs associated with the risk taking that permits constrained
agents to exploit the subsidy implicit in the guarantees.
5 Related Literature
Most of the empirical literature on ﬁnancial liberalization and economic performance focuses either
on growth or on ﬁnancial fragility and excess volatility. Beckaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004) ﬁnd
a robust and economically important link between stock market liberalization and growth, while
Henry (2002) ﬁnds similar evidence by focusing on private investment.39 Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1998) and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) show that the propensity to crises and stock market
volatility increase in the aftermath of ﬁnancial liberalization. Our ﬁndings help to integrate these
contrasting views.
38This is consistent with the view that in developed economies it might not be justiﬁed to subsidize risk-taking.
39In contrast, the evidence on the link between capital account liberalization and growth is mixed. See Eichengreen
and Leblang (2003) and Prasad et.al. (2003).A novelty of this paper is to use skewness to analyze economic growth. In the ﬁnance literature,
skewness of stock market returns plays an important role —e.g., Beckaert and Harvey (1997), Kraus
and Litzenberger (1976), Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Veldkamp (2004). This paper borrows
from the ﬁnance literature the idea that variance is not suﬃcient to characterize risk when the
distribution of stock returns is asymmetric.
In our empirical analysis, the negative link between skewness and growth coexists with the
negative link between variance and growth identiﬁed by Ramey and Ramey (1995). The contrasting
growth eﬀects of diﬀerent sources of risk are also present in Imbs (2004), who ﬁnds that aggregate
volatility is bad for growth, while sectorial volatility is good for growth.
A key result of this paper is that a bailout policy that discourages hedging can be eﬃcient as it
induces a redistribution from non-constrained to constrained agents. Tirole (2003) and Tirole and
Pathak (2004) reach a similar conclusion in a diﬀerent set up. In their framework, a country pegs
the exchange rate as a means to signal a strong currency and attract foreign capital. Thus, it must
discourage hedging and withstand speculative attacks in order for the signal to be credible.
By focusing on the growth consequences of imperfect contract enforceability, this paper is con-
nected with the growth and institutions literature pioneered by North (1981). For instance, Ace-
moglu et.al. (2003) show that better institutions lead to higher growth, lower variance and less
frequent crises. In our model, better institutions also lead to higher growth, and it is never optimal
for countries with strong institutions to undertake systemic risk. Our contribution is to show how
systemic risk can enhance growth by counteracting the ﬁnancial bottlenecks generated by weak
institutions.
Obstfeld (1994) demonstrates that ﬁnancial openness increases growth if international risk-
sharing allows agents to shift from safe to risky projects. In our framework, the growth gains are
obtained by letting ﬁrms take on more risk and attain greater leverage.
T h ec y c l e si nt h i sp a p e ra r ed i ﬀerent from schumpeterian cycles in which the adoption of new
technologies and the cleansing eﬀect of recessions play a key role —e.g., Aghion and Saint Paul (1998),
Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Schumpeter (1934). Our cycles resemble Juglar’s credit cycles
in which ﬁnancial bottlenecks play a dominant role. Juglar (1862, 1863) characterized asymmetric
credit cycles along with the periodic occurrence of crises in France, England, and United States
during the nineteen century.
Our model is related to Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2003) who consider two productivesectors: a tradables sector with access to international ﬁnancial markets that uses inputs from
the constrained nontradables sector. Greater investment by the latter beneﬁts the former through
cheaper inputs. That paper uses the framework of Schneider and Tornell (2004) to generate systemic
risk via currency mismatch. It also generates several of the stylized facts associated with recent
boom-bust cycles. The present one-sector model is not designed to generate such stylized facts.
The gain is that the link between systemic risk and growth is transparent.
The growth enhancing eﬀect of systemic risk shares some similarities with the role of bubbles
in Olivier (2000) and Ventura (2004). In these papers, bubbles can foster growth by encouraging
investment. The idea that introducing a new distortion counteracts the eﬀects of an existing dis-
tortion is also present in our approach as systemic guarantees relax ﬁnancial bottlenecks. However,
our results do not exploit any form of dynamic ineﬃciency and our risky equilibria are sustainable
over the inﬁnite horizon. Finally, the mechanism we present is reminiscent of the literature on risk
as a factor of production as Sinn (1986) and Konrad (1992).
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have found a robust link between systemic risk and growth: fast growing countries tend to
experience occasional crises. In order to uncover this link it is essential to distinguish booms
punctuated by rare abrupt busts from other up-and-down patterns that are more frequent or
symmetric. Both lead to higher variance, but only the former leads to lower skewness. This is
why we use the skewness of credit growth, not the variance, to capture the volatility generated by
crises.
Our empirical ﬁndings shed light on two contrasting views of ﬁnancial liberalization. In one
view, ﬁnancial liberalization induces excessive risk-taking, increases macroeconomic volatility and
leads to more frequent crises. In another view, liberalization strengthens ﬁnancial development and
contributes to higher long-run growth. Our ﬁndings indicate that, while liberalization does lead to
risk taking and occasional crises, it also raises grow t hr a t e s— e v e nw h e nt h ec o s t so fc r i s e sa r et a k e n
into account.
We explain this empirical relationship by developing a theoretical mechanism based on the
existence of ﬁnancial bottlenecks in countries with weak institutions. Policies that permit systemic
risk taking allow ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms to attain greater leverage, which leads to greaterinvestment and growth along a path without crises. If this leverage eﬀect is strong enough, the
gains from larger investment will dominate the losses from occasional ﬁnancial crises.
The bailout guarantees that support the systemic risk have ﬁscal costs. Thus, higher growth
need not be socially eﬃcient. We show that, in economies with weak institutions, if the leverage
eﬀect is strong enough and the economy as a whole beneﬁts from the production of credit constrained
ﬁrms, the redistribution implicit in the guarantees is socially eﬃcient.
In principle, an alternative policy is for a planner to make direct transfers to credit constrained
ﬁrms. Such policies —in vogue a few decades ago— have often failed. In contrast, our decentralized
mechanism uses the monitoring capacity of the ﬁnancial system to make implicit transfers via
the guarantees, while maintaining lenders’ incentives to screen borrowers’ projects. There is an
important caveat: systemic risk is not beneﬁcial in every economy with weak institutions. In
particular, the degree of contract enforceability must be high enough that risk-taking translates
i n t oas u ﬃciently high increase in leverage. Furthermore, a strong enough regulatory framework
must be in place to avoid practices that simply ma s kc o r r u p t i o na n dt ow i t h s t a n dp r e s s u r e st o
grant a bailout whenever an individual ﬁrm defaults. The design of systemic bailout policies is an
important area for future research.
This paper contributes to the discussion of whether ﬁnancial liberalization should be imple-
mented before other reforms have been implemented. While the ﬁr s tb e s ti st oi m p l e m e n tj u d i c i a l
reform and improve the quality of institutions, if such reforms are not feasible, ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion and an increase in risk taking appear to improve economic growth rates even after the eﬀects
of crises have been taken into account.References
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 1 . We will compare the payoﬀso fas a f ep l a n( Ir
t =0 )and a risky
plan (Is
t =0 ) . In a safe plan with no-diversion the ﬁrm will be solvent in both states. Thus, the
entrepreneur oﬀers 1+ρt =1+r, and the no-diversion condition is bt(1+r) ≤ h(wt+bt). It follows
that Is
t = mswt and bt =[ ms − 1]wt, with ms = 1
1−hδ.
In a risky plan with no-diversion the ﬁrm will be solvent only in the good state. Thus, the
interest rate must satisfy u(1 + ρt)bt +( 1− ut+1)(1 + ρt)bt =( 1+r). If a bailout is expected
(ut+1 = u), then 1+ρt =1+r and the no-diversion condition is ubt(1 +r) ≤ h(wt +bt). It follows
that Ir
t = mrwt and bt =[ mr − 1]wt, with mr = 1
1−hδu−1. If no bailout is expected (ut+1 =1 ) ,
then 1+ρt = u−1(1 + r) and the no-diversion condition is ubt(1 + r) ≤ h(wt + bt). It follows that
expected payoﬀsa r e
πs
t+1 =[ σ − h]ms; Et(πr
t+1|BG)=[ θu − h]mr,E t(πr
t+1|no BG)=[ θu − h]ms
If all other entrepreneurs choose the safe plan, no bailout is expected. Since θu<σ, it follows
that [θu − h]ms < [σ − h]ms. Thus, the entrepreneur will strictly prefer the safe plan. Hence,
there always exists a safe symmetric equilibrium. If all other entrepreneurs choose the risky plan,
a bailout is expected in the bad state. Thus, an entrepreneur will strictly prefer a risky plan if and
only if






















(δσ − 1) > 0 (18)
It follows that there exists a unique threshold h ∈ (0,uδ−1) such that Et(πr
t+1) > πs
t+1 for all










Proof of Proposition 3.2. T h em e a na n n u a ll o n g - r u ng r o w t hr a t ei sg i v e nb y







. The expression in (13) follows from the fact that
the probability of crisis is independent across time. Comparing (11) and (13) we have thatE(1 + gr) > (1 + gs) for any α > 0 if and only if Eπr > πs, which is equivalent to h>h
(deﬁned in (19)). The second part of the proposition follows from ∂Z(h)/∂h>0 a ss h o w ni n( 1 8 ) .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 1 . We start by deriving Y r = E0
X∞
t=0 yt in closed form. Without loss
of generality consider a tax sequence in which, during each period, taxes equal the bailout payment.
It then follows that the representative consumer’s net income in crisis and no-crisis times (yc
t and
yn
t ) are, respectively
yc











To derive the third equality in yc
t notice that if there is a crisis at t, then wt = at = αγnwt−1. Next,
notice that the process
yt+1
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(20)
To obtain (20) note that if there is no crisis at t, wt
wt−1 = γn, while if there is a crisis at t, wt
wt−1 = αγn.
We will obtain Y r by solving the following recursion
V (y0,δ0)=E0
X∞
t=0 yt = y0 + E0V (y1,δ1)
V (yt,δt)=yt + EtV (yt+1,δt+1) (21)
Consider the following guess: V (yt,δt)=ytv(δt), with v(δt) an undetermined coeﬃcient. Substi-
tuting this guess into (21) and dividing by yt,w eg e tv(δt)=1+δEt(δt+1v(δt+1)). Combining this
condition with (20), it follows that v(δt+1) satisﬁes
(v1,v 2,v 3,v 4)0 =( 1 ,1,1,1)0 + Φ(δnv1,δncv2,δcv3,δcnv4)0
Notice that v1 = v4 and v2 = v3. Thus, the system collapses to two equations: v1 =1+uδnnv1 +
(1 − u)δncv2 and v2 =1+( 1− u)δccv2 + uδcnv1. The solution is
v1 =
1 − (1 − u)(δc − δnc)
(1 − uδn)(1 − (1 − u)δc) − (1 − u)uδcnδnc =
1 − (1 − u) 1
d−e[(1 − e)αγn +( mr − 1)(1 − d)]
(1 − uγn)(1 − (1 − u)αγn) − (1 − u)uα(γn)
2To derive the second equation substitute δcnδnc = α(γn)
2 and δc − δnc = 1
d−e[(1 − e)αγn +( mr −
1)(1 − d)]. This solution exists and is unique provided 1 − uγn − (1 − u)αγn > 0. We can always
ensure that this condition holds by setting d large enough. Next, notice that since there cannot be
ac r i s i sa tt =0 ,t h es t a t ea tt =0is v1. Therefore, V (y0,δ0)=v1yn
0. Substituting yn
0 = dw−1 and
simplifying the denominator of v1 we get (16).
We determine the threshold h∗∗ in three steps. First, we show that dY r
de − dY s
de < 0 for all h>h ,







1 − (1 − u)αγn
1 − γr +
1




1 − γs < 0 ⇔ h>h




1−γs. It follows that if
h>hthere exists an interval (0,ε) for e on which Y r >Ys only if (Y r −Y s)|e=0 > 0. Second, set
e =0and rewrite (15) and (16) as follows
Y s =1+
(1 − d)(σ − 1)
1 − h − (1 − d)(σ − h)
,Y r =1+
(1 − d)(uθ − 1)
1 − u−1h − (1 − d)(θ − u−1h)[u + α(1 − u)]
There exists an upper bound h0 =
1−(1−d)[u+α(1−u)]θ
1−(1−d)[u+α(1−u)] ·u, such that limh→h0 Y r(h)=∞.N o t i c et h a t :
(i) Y s(h0) < ∞; (ii) h0 <u ,so borrowing constraints arise for any h<h 0; (iii) h0 >h , so a risky
equilibrium exists in a neighborhood of h0. Next, notice that Y r and Y s are strictly increasing in
h. Thus, if e =0 , there exist a unique threshold h00 <h 0 such that Y r ≥ (<)Y s ⇔ h ≥ (<)h00
h00 =
(1 − θ(1 − d)U)(σ − 1) − (1 − σ(1 − d))(uθ − 1)
−d(uθ − 1) − u−1((1 − d)U − 1)(σ − 1)
,U = u + α(1 − u)
Finally, since an RSE exists for all h ∈ (h,u), by Proposition 3.1, and (Y r −Y s)|e=0>0 ⇔ h>h 00,
it follows that the threshold in Proposition 4.1 is h∗∗ > max{h00,h}.
Proof of Corollary (4.1). Let α → 0 and rewrite the excess returns ratio as
Y r − w−1
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Notice that k(h) < 1 because 1 <u θ < σ and 0 <h<u<1, and recall that h = h ⇔ Eπr = πs.
Therefore, (22) implies that if α → 0 and h = h, risk-taking translates into a social loss if h = h.
Since Y r − Y s is increasing in h, it follows that h <h ∗∗ if α → 0. That is, the treshold level for
eﬃciency gains (Y r >Ys) is above the treshold for optimal risk-taking (Eπr > πs).Appendix B: Simulations
The behavior of the model economy is determined by seven parameters: θ,σ,d,r,u,α,h. We
set the probability of crisis (1 − u) equal to the historical probability of systemic banking crisis.
Using the survey of Caprio and Klingebiel ( 2003) we ﬁnd that 1 − u =4 .18% across our sample
of 83 countries over 1980-2000.40,41 Since in our model α =
1+growth lucky times
1+growth crisis times,w ee s t i m a t eα
using the following algorithm. First, we average over all systemic banking crises in our sample the
minimum annual growth rate during each crisis: we obtain gc = −7.23% with a standard deviation
of σgc =5 .83%. Second, we compute the average growth rate over non-crisis years: gn =1 .43%
with a standard deviation σgn =4 .11. Third, we consider a drop from a boom (gn +2 σgn) to a
severe bust (gc − 2σgc) and obtain α =0 .79. In our benchmark simulation, we set α even more
conservatively α =0 .5. The interest rate r, is set to the average Fed funds rate during the nineties:
5.13%.
Given the values of r and u, we determine the range for the degree of contract enforceability
h over which risky and safe equilibria exist: h ∈ (h =0 .48,u δ−1 =1 .006). In our benchmark
simulation, we set h =0 .5. Finally, the technological parameters (θ,σ) and the payout rate d
do not have an empirical counterpart and are irrelevant for the existence of equilibria. We set
d = 10% and the return to the safe technology to 10% (σ =1 .1). We then set θ =1 .12 so as to
satisfy the restriction 1+r<θu<σ < θ. The following table summarizes the parameters used in
our benchmark simulation presented in Figure 4.
Parameters baseline value
Safe Return σ =1 .10
Risky High Return θ =1 .12
World Interest Rate r =0 .0513
Dividend Rate d =0 .10
Financial Distress Costs α =0 .50
Probability of crisis 1 − u =0 .0418
Degree of Contract Enforceability h =0 .50
40Caprio and Klingbiel deﬁne a systemic banking crises as a situation where the aggregate losses of the banking
sector exhaust the aggregate capital of the banking sector. If we use the banking crisis index of Von Hagen and Ho
(2004), based on money market pressure for a sample of 47 countries, we ﬁnd 1 − u =0 .06.
41If we consider currency crises, which are more frequent and generally less cosly, we ﬁnd 1 − u =8 .75%.Figure 1: Safe vs. risky growth path: a comparison of India and Thailand 
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Kernel Density (Epanechnikov, h =  0.1000)
 
 
 India  Thailand 
 Mean   0.066   0.102 
 Std. Dev.   0.050   0.117 
 Skewness  -0.286  -1.026 
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 Note: The vertical axis in each graph shows the residuals of the cross section regression, given in Table 1, 
leaving out the mean, variance and skewness of real credit growth, respectively. The horizontal axis shows the 
three moments of real credit growth. 
 
Figure 4: Long Run Growth
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TIME Figure 5: Risky vs. Safe: The Role of Contract Enforceability 
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)Table 1: Skewness and Growth 
 





















 System Estimator 
      
Initial per capita GDP  -0.463  -0.263**  -0.157 
 (0.356)  (0.122) (0.172) 
Secondary schooling  0.020  0.020**  0.139** 
 (0.020)  (0.006) (0.274) 
Credit growth, mean  0.161**  0.178**  0.147** 
 (0.049)  (0.010) (0.017) 
Credit growth, variance  -0.045**  -0.044**  -0.064** 
 (0.023)  (0.0089  (0.007) 
Credit growth, skewness  -0.406**  -0.302**  -0.204** 
 (0.194)  (0.052) (0.084) 
    
      
# of observations  58  114  114 
  
a) Regression 1 is estimated by OLS 
b) Regression 2 is estimated by pooled GLS from a panel of non-overlapping 10 year windows. The Durbin 
Watson Test for this regression is 1.88. 
c) Regression 3 is a panel regression with non-overlapping 10 year windows using the GMM System Estimator 
The Sargan Test (p-value) is 0.609. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses; ** denotes significance at 5% level, *denotes significance at 
10% level.  
 
 
Table 2: Moments of Credit Growth for different country groups:  
  
  HEC Countries  MEC Countries  LEC Countries 
 Mean  0.031  0.077  0.042 
 Std. Dev.  0.091  0.145  0.174 
 Skewness  0.526  -1.441  -0.677 
 
Note: HEC, MEC and LEC denote high, low and middle enforceability of contracts, respectively. The entries in 
the table are computed using country-years within each group. 
 
 
Table 3: Moments of Credit Growth Before and After Financial Liberalization 
 




 Mean  0.067  0.034 
 Std. Dev.  0.130  0.170 
 Skewness  -0.707  0.049 
 
Note: The sample is partitioned into two country-years groups: liberalized and non-liberalized Table 4a: Country Groups 
 
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth 
   Sample of 58 countries without wars     Sample of all 83 countries 
   or large terms of trade deteriorations         
                    
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) 
 
MEC  vs.     
HEC and 








                     
Initial per capita GDP  0.009  -0.550**  -0.650**    -0.191**  -0.505** 
  (0.106) (0.33) (0.112)    (0.081)  (0.092) 
Secondary  schooling  0.013**  0.012**  0.021**  0.029**  0.034** 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)    (0.004) (0.005) 
Credit  growth,  mean  0.089**  0.243**  0.112**  0.135**  0.193** 
  (0.012) (0.036) (0.037)    (0.009) (0.007) 
Credit growth, variance  -0.031**  -0.041**  -0.017    -0.009**  -0.039** 
  (0.01)  (0.024) (0.018)    (0.001) (0.007) 
Credit growth, skewness  -0.138**  -0.410**  0.3    -0.216**  -0.341** 
  (0.052) (0.183) (0.216)    (0.041) (0.049) 
Credit growth, mean *MEC  0.233**            
 (0.035)             
Credit growth, variance *MEC  0.02            
 (0.019)             
Credit growth, skewness *MEC  -0.484**            
 (0.159)             
Credit growth, mean *Liberalized      0.005       
     (0.042)      
Credit growth, variance * Liberalized      -0.022       
     (0.022)      
Credit growth, skewness *Liberalized      -0.580**       
     (0.229)       
Credit growth, mean              -0.102** 
*WAR/TOT             (0.02) 
Credit growth, variance              0.030** 
*WAR/TOT             (0.007) 
Credit growth, skewness              0.433** 
*WAR/TOT             (0.162) 
MEC -0.710**             
 (0.34)             
Liberalized     2.165**       
     (0.519)       
WAR/TOT             -1.296** 
             (0.271) 
# of observations  114  46  101     166  166 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the benchmark regression (regression (2) in Table 1) for different country 
groups. Regression (1) includes an interaction dummy that takes dummy that takes a value of 1 if the country is an 
MEC according to the “Rule of Law” index of Kaufman and Kraay, and zero otherwise. Regression (2) includes the 
middle enforceability countries only. Regression (3) includes an interaction dummy that takes a value of 1 if a 
country has liberalized and zero otherwise. Regression (4) includes all 83 countries in the sample. In regression (5), 
we include an interaction dummy for countries with wars and large term of trade deteriorations. The dates and a 
description of the construction of the liberalization index are given in the appendix.        
Table 4b: Summary of Credit Moment Coefficients in Different Country Groups 
     
    Mean  Variance  Skewness     
MEC  Countries  0.322**  -0.011**  -0.622**     
HEC and LEC Countries  0.089**  -0.031**  -0.138**       
Difference  0.233**  0.02  -0.484**     
Financially  Liberalized  0.117**  -0.039**  -0.28**     
Non  Financially  Liberalized  0.112**  -0.017  0.3     
Difference  0.005  -0.022  -0.58**     
War/TOT  Countries  0.091**  -0.009**  0.092**     
Non War/TOT Countries  0.193**  -0.039**  -0.341**       
Difference  -0.102**  0.03**  0.433**     
 
Note: The coefficients for MEC, financial liberalized and War/ToT countries correspond to the sum of  
interacted and non-interacted coefficients in Table 4a. Significance levels are derived from Wald Tests 
(Ho: sum of interacted and non-interacted coefficients equals zero). 




Table 5: Endogeneity  
 












Dependent variable: Real 





















          
Initial per capita GDP  -0.393  -0.393  Initial per capita GDP  0.119  0.119 
 (0.286)  (0.304)    (0.156)  (0.164) 
Secondary  schooling  0.034** 0.034**  Secondary  schooling  0.010 0.010 
 (0.015)  (0.017)    (0.008)  (0.009) 
Credit growth, mean  0.250**  0.250**  Credit growth, mean  0.078**  0.078** 
 (0.053)  (0.060)    (0.019)  (0.021) 
Credit growth, variance  -0.021  -0.021  Credit growth, variance  0.010  0.010 
 (0.024)  (0.033)    (0.013)  (0.012) 
Credit growth, skewness  -1.330**  -1.330**  Liberalization  -1.020**  -1.020** 
 (0.626)  (0.666)    (0.345) (0.331) 
      
# of observations  99 99    99  99 
  
Note: The instrument for skewness is the liberalization index. Regressions (1) and (2) show the second stage of 
the regression, regressions (3) and (4) the first stage, estimated with OLS and GMM, respectively. We 
performed a regression-based Hausman test, where we include the residual of the 1
st stage regression in the main 
regression equation. Since the coefficient on this residual is not significant - with a p-value of 0.107-, we 
conclude that OLS is a consistent estimator for skewness. Note however that the F-statistic for the first stage of 
the regression is only 5.03. Table 6: Outliers 
 
Dependent variable: Real per capita GDP growth 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) 
Excluded Countries   Jordan  Niger  Papua-NG  Botswana  Korea  China  All Outliers
          
Initial per capita GDP  -0.338**  -0.276**  -0.174  -0.421**  -0.158  -0.068  -0.148 
 (0.117)  (0.114)  (0.122) (0.114) (0.122) (0.122) (0.116) 
Secondary schooling  0.024**  0.019**  0.016** 0.029** 0.015** 0.012**  0.015** 
 (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Credit growth, mean  0.174**  0.172**  0.174** 0.178** 0.170** 0.168**  0.144** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Credit growth, variance  -0.045**  -0.047**  -0.043**  -0.040**  -0.043**  -0.037**  -0.041** 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Credit growth, skewness  -0.320**  -0.288**  -0.342**  -0.292**  -0.274**  -0.248**  -0.244** 
 (0.050)  (0.037)  (0.058) (0.055) (0.050) (0.049) (0.047) 
           
          
# of observations  112  112  113  112 112 112 103 
Note: There are no statistical outliers in our benchmark regression (regression [ 2] in table 1), in the sense that one of the 
residuals is more that 2 standard deviations away from the mean. In regressions (1)-(3), we individually exclude the 
countries with the larges country-decade residuals from the regression. In regressions (4)-(6), we individually exclude the 
countries with the lowest country-decade residuals. In regression (7), we exclude all countries with extreme observations. 
 
 
Table 7: Extended set of control variables 
 










Initial per capita GDP  -0.257**  -0.265**  0.000  -0.011 
  (0.122) (0.122) (0.140) (0.143) 
Secondary schooling  0.020**  0.021**  0.009  0.009 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Government  share  -0.038** -0.038** -0.041** -0.037** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
Life Expectancy    0.016  -0.002  0.003 
   (0.076)  (0.073)  (0.007) 
Inflation     -0.017**  -0.016** 
     (0.003)  (0.002) 
Terms of trade growth        0.064 
      (0.052) 
Credit  growth,  mean  0.171** 0.172** 0.165** 0.162** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) 
Credit  growth,  variance -0.053** -0.053** -0.019** -0.088** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) 
Credit  growth,  skewness  -0.254** -0.258** -0.242** -0.245** 
  (0.060) (0.060) (0.065) (0.066) 
    
# of observations  114  114  114  114 
Note: In regressions (1)-(4) we add standard control variables used in the empirical growth literature to our 
benchmark regression (regression (2) in Table 1). 
Table 8a: Alternative estimation techniques for set of Non-War/non-TOT countries 
 



















Initial per capita GDP  -0.263**  -3.479**  -0.217  -0.243** 
  (0.122) (0.082) (0.253) (0.129) 
Secondary schooling  0.020**  0.038**  0.018*  0.019** 
  (0.006) (0.002) (0.013) (0.007) 
Credit  growth,  mean  0.178** 0.061** 0.154** 0.160** 
  (0.010) (0.002) (0.027) (0.011) 
Credit  growth,  variance -0.044** -0.038** -0.041** -0.045** 
  (0.008) (0.001) (0.019) (0.008) 
Credit  growth,  skewness  -0.302**  -0.077** -0.254* -0.226** 
  (0.052) (0.013) (0.141) (0.057) 
       





Table 8b: Alternative estimation techniques for the set of 83 countries 
 



















Initial per capita GDP  -0.191**  -3.465**  -0.239  -0.192** 
  (0.081) (0.118) (0.202) (0.080) 
Secondary  schooling  0.029** 0.043** 0.028** 0.029** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) 
Credit  growth,  mean  0.135** 0.065** 0.119** 0.136** 
  (0.009) (0.003) (0.016) (0.010) 
Credit  growth,  variance -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Credit  growth,  skewness  -0.216**  -0.044** -0.109 -0.203** 
  (0.041) (0.014) (0.122) (0.036) 
       
# of observations  166  166  166 166 
  
Table 9: Overlapping Panel  Regressions           
              
Dependent variable: Real per Capita GDP growth           
              
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
                       
Constant 4.633**    3.420**    4.794**    3.231** 
 (0.896)    (0.108)   (0.932)    (0.056) 
Initial per capita GDP  -0.766**    -0.526**    -0.727**    -0.420** 
 (0.152)    (0.018)   (0.148)    (0.008) 
Secondary schooling  0.052**    0.038**    0.052**    0.035** 
 (0.008)    (0.001)   (0.008)    (0.001) 
Real Credit Growth, Mean  0.070**    0.122**    0.069**    0.126** 
 (0.016)    (0.002)    (0.015)    0.002 
Real Credit Growth, Variance  0.006    -0.014**    0.001    -0.019** 
 0.011    (0.001)    (0.01)    (0.001) 
Real Credit Growth, Skewness  -0.271**    -0.418**    -0.258**    -0.404** 
 (0.097)    (0.011)   (0.08)    (0.007) 
Time trend           0.024*    0.055* 
         (0.018)    0.002 
Government share          -0.043**    -0.0497** 
         (0.018)    (0.001) 
Inflation         -0.001    0.0006 
         (0.001)    (0.001) 
                       
# of observations  638     638     638     638 
Note: All regressions are estimated using a two-step pooled GMM estimator proposed by Beckaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2001). In Columns (1) and (3), the choice of the weighting matrix makes the estimation equivalent to 
pooled OLS with a correction for a moving average MA(9) component in the residuals. In Columns (2) and (4), 





Table C1: Systemic Banking Crises and Skewness of Real Credit Growth 
 
country  Banking Crises Years*
Lowest Credit Growth 
During Crisis
Skewness Credit Growth  
All Years




Argentina 1980-1982 0.00 -1.66 -0.44 -1.22
Argentina 1989-1990 -0.55 " " "
Argentina 1995 -0.03 " " "
Brazil 1990 -0.38 0.99 1.14 -0.15
Chile 1981-1983 -0.12 0.52 0.83 -0.31
Colombia 1982-1987 0.01 -0.29 -0.42 0.13
Costa Rica 1994-1995 -0.20 -0.48 -0.67 0.19
Finland 1991-1994 -0.12 -0.37 -0.06 -0.31
Indonesia 1997-2000 -0.83 -2.64 0.88 -3.52
Jamaica 1996-2000 0.01 -0.42 -0.17 -0.25
Kenya 1992-1995 -0.38 -0.68 0.25 -0.93
Korea, Rep. 1997-2000 0.04 -0.26 -0.08 -0.18
Mexico 1994-2000 -0.49 -0.19 0.00 -0.19
Malaysia 1997-2000 -0.02 -0.01 0.10 -0.11
Niger 1983-1990 -0.19 -0.94 -0.82 -0.12
Norway 1990-1993 -0.07 0.32 0.41 -0.09
Panama 1988-1989 -0.23 -0.92 -0.07 -0.85
Sweden 1991-1994 -0.26 -0.93 0.22 -1.15
Thailand 1997-2000 -0.19 -0.90 -0.70 -0.20
Uruguay 1981-1984 -0.47 0.05 1.11 -1.06
Average -0.49 0.08 -0.57
Average All Sample 0.09
* Systemic Banking Crises with Output Loss in our  sample of 58 countries over 1980-2000
Source: Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven and Noguera (2003) http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/database_sfd.htmlTable C2: Definitions and Sources of Variables in Regression Analysis 
 
 
Variable Definition and Construction Source
GDP per capita Ratio of total GDP to total 
population. GDP is in 1985 
PPP-adjusted US$. 
 World Development Indicators (2003).
GDP per capita growth  Log difference of real GDP 
per capita.
World Development Indicators (2003).
Initial GDP per capita Initial value of ratio of total 
GDP to total population. 
GDP is in 1985 PPP-adjusted 
US$. 
 World Development Indicators (2003).
Education Ratio of total secondary 
enrollment, regardless of age, 
to the population of the age 
group that officially 
corresponds to that level of 
education. 
 World Development Indicators (2003).
Real Credit  Growth Log difference of real  
domestic bank credit claims 
on private sector
Author’s calculations using data from IFS -
line 22d -, and publications of Central
Banks. The method is based on Beck,
Demiguc-Kunt and Levine (1999).
Domestic Bank Credit Claims are deflated




Term of Trade Growth Growth rate of the Terms of 
Trade Index . Terms of Trade 
index shows the national 
accounts exports price index 
divided by the imports price 
index with a 1995 base year
 World Development Indicators (2003).
Government Share Ratio of government 
consumption to GDP.
World Development Indicators, The 
World Bank  (2003).
CPI Consumer price index at the 
end of year (1995 = 100) 
Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
Inflation rate Annual % change in CPI Author’s calculations with data from IFS.




Financial Liberalization Index 
 
It is a de facto index that signals the year when a country has liberalized. We construct the index by looking for 
trend-breaks in financial flows. We identify trend-breaks by applying the CUSUM test of Brown et. al. (1975) to 
the time trend of the data. This method tests for parameter stability based on the cumulative sum of the recursive 
residuals. To determine the date of financial liberalization we consider net cumulative capital inflows (KI).
1 An 
MEC or LEC is financially liberalized (FL) at year t if: (i) KI has a trend break at or before t and there is at least 
one year with a KI-to-GDP ratio greater than 5% at or before t, or (ii) its KI-to-GDP ratio is greater than 10% at 
or before t, or (iii) the country is associated with the EU. The 5% and 10% thresholds reduce the possibility of 
false liberalization and false non-liberalization signals, respectively.
 2 
 
When the cumulative sum of residuals starts to deviate from zero, it may take a few years until this deviation is 
statistically significant. In order to account for the delay problem, we choose the year where the cumulative sum 
of residuals deviates from zero, provided that it eventually crosses the 5% significance level.  The FL index does 
not allow for policy reversals: once a country liberalizes it never becomes close thereafter. Since our sample 
period is 1980-2000, we consider that our approach is the correct one to analyse the effects of liberalization on 
long-run growth and financial fragility.
3 
                                                 
1 We compute cumulative net capital inflows of non-residents since 1980. Capital inflows include FDI, portfolio 
flows and bank flows. The data series are from the IFS: lines 78BUDZF, 78BGDZF and 78BEDZ. For some 
countries not all three series are available for all years. In this case, we use the inflows to the banking system 
only, which is available for all country-years. 
2 All HECs have been financially liberalized through our sample period. 
3 If after liberalization a country suffers a sharp reversal in capital flows (like in a financial crisis), it might 
exhibit a second breakpoint. In our sample, however, this possibility is not present: the trend breaks due to crises 
are never large enough to show up in significant CUSUM test statistics. 
Criteria Definition and Construction Source
Systemic Banking Crises Annual Dummy Variable with Value 1 if the country
experience a systemic banking crisis, 0 otherwise
Author’s calculations using data from
Caprio et. al. ( 2003)
Severe War Episode Countries that have an (estimated average number of 
violent deaths/average population) *100 above 0,005 
for two consecutive years
Heidelberg Institute of International 
Conflict Research (HIIK)
Large Term of Trade 
Deterioration
Experience of a 30% or larger drop in a single year in 
the terms of trade index (see definition of Term of 
Trade Index table A)
 World Development Indicators (2003).
Contract Enforceability Countries are ranked according to their Kaufman and 
Kraay Index of the “Rule of Law”. Countries with a 
value of more than 1.3 are classified as HECs. On the 
lower bound, we classified countries with a stock 
market turnover to GDP ratio of less than 1% as a 
criterion as LECs. The remaining countries are 
classified MECs
Kaufman and Kraay (2003), Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2002)
Financial Liberalization Index See below See belowTable C4: Country Groupings 
 
Country Severe War Episode
Large Terms of Trade 
Deterioration













Chile Ma l w a y s
China M 1991
Cote d'Ivoire X
Congo, Rep. X X
Colombia L 1991
Costa Rica L always
Germany Ha l w a y s





Spain Ma l w a y s
Finland H always
France Ha l w a y s
H always
Ghana X







Ireland Ha l w a y s
Iran X X
Iceland Ha l w a y s
Israel M 1990
Italy Ma l w a y s
Jamaica L 1994
Jordan M 1989
Japan Ha l w a y s
Kenya L 1993











Norway Ha l w a y s
























Congo, Dem. Rep. X X
Zambia X
Zimbabwe M never
* L,M,H denotes low, middle and high contract enforceability in the 58 countries sample
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